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WORKERS COMPENSATION
H. Alston Johnson*
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
There were only two amendments to the Compensation Act dur-
ing the 1982 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature. Act 611
added Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1274(D) to provide a procedure
for settlement of death claims. This procedure requires the presenta-
tion of an affidavit attesting to the death of the employee, proof of
the claimant's relationship to the deceased, and an assertion of a legal
right to benefits under the Act. All of these items are to be attached
to the joint petition to be submitted for court approval. Act 829 added
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1047 to exempt from the Act real estate
brokers or salesmen licensed to do business in Louisiana, while working
in the "course and scope" of the real estate business. The Act further
provides that all rights in tort are reserved to the employer and the
employee.
The biggest controversy in the legislative session was over House
Bill 256, which did not pass. The bill, sponsored by the Louisiana
Association of Business and Industry, would have made a number of
fundamental changes in the Act, including the introduction of a sort
of commission as the tribunal of first instance. The bill was heavily
amended in the Senate after its House passage, and after the House
refused to concur in the Senate amendments, a conference committee
report was rejected by the House.
UNUSUAL EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS
In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Bollich, a physician leased land to
a lessee who was to grow crops there. The lessor agreed to pay
designated percentages of the costs and receive in return the same
percentages of the profit. The lessee's son actually farmed the land.
There was a cooperative arrangement among the farmers in the area
to lend combines and operators to each other during harvest time.
On the day in question, another farmer had sent a combine and
operator to assist the lessee's son in the harvest. The operator was
killed while operating the combine on the leased land. The compensa-
Copyright 1982, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. 408 So. 2d 20 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
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tion carrier for the lending farmer paid benefits to the dependents
of the operator and then sought contribution from the lessor of the
land, the lessee, and the lessee's son. The appellate court properly
affirmed a summary judgment as to the lessor, on the ground that
there was no evidence that he had borrowed the operator under these
circumstances. He paid the man nothing, did not direct the work, and
had no control over the manner in which the work was done.
In a case of first impression, an individual who was injured while
"trying out" for a job was limited to compensation rather than a tort
claim.2 The claimant had apparently not been formally hired, but was
being given an opportunity to operate a shirt-finishing machine to see
whether she would be hired. She injured herself in the process and
sued both in tort and in compensation. A number of decisions from
other states' limiting such claimants to compensation were brought
to the court's attention, and an exception of no cause of action to
the tort claim was sustained. Louisiana courts apparently had not faced
such a problem in previous cases, but the result seems correct by
analogy to those cases in which the employment arrangement had
either barely begun or already terminated.' Such claims are
manageable from an administrative standpoint, since the injured
employee was on the employment premises, was using the employer's
equipment, and, in fact, was doing what other employees were doing.
Thus the risk is fairly predictable and does not expose the employer
or the carrier to exotic risks beyond the confines of the workplace.
PHYSICAL HARM RESULTING FROM EMOTIONAL EXCITEMENT
In McDonald v. International Paper Co.,, the supreme court an-
nounced the logical extension of its rationale in Ferguson v. HDE,
Inc.,' where it had recognized that an unusual mental or emotional
2. Burton v. Country Boys, Inc., No. 63,087-F (21st Dist. Ct. Aug. 9, 1982).
3. Woodell v. Brown & Root, Inc., 616 S.W.2d 781 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981); County
of Los Angeles v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 30 Cal. 3d 391, 637 P.2d
681, 179 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1981); Laeng v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, 6
Cal. 3d 771, 494 P.2d 1, 100 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1972); Moore v. Gundelfinger, 56 Mich.
App. 73, 223 N.W.2d 643 (1974); Erickson v. Holland, 295 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. 1980);
Bode v. 0. & W. Restaurant, 9 A.D.2d 969, 193 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y.App. Div. 1959);
Smith v. Venezian Lamp Co., 5 A.D.2d 12, 168 N.Y.S.2d 764 (N.Y.App. Div. 1957;
Lotspeich v. Chance Vought Aircraft, 369 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). Contra
Fineberg v. Public Serv. Ry. Co., 108 A. 311 (N.J. 1919); Dykes v. State Ace. Ins. Fund,
47 Or. App. 187, 613 P.2d 1106 (1980). For these authorities and for information about
the case discussed in the text, the author is indebted to Frank M. RePass of the New
Orleans and Slidell Bars.
4. See 1 W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW & PRACTICE
56 & 170 in 13 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1980).
5. 406 So. 2d 582 (La. 1981).
6. 264 La. 204, 270 So. 2d 867 (1972).
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cause could produce a compensable accidental effect in a worker. The
claimant in Ferguson had recently accepted new employment and was
dismayed to find that his first paycheck was not as high as he thought
it ought to be. Following an argument about it, he suffered a "flash
of pain . . .followed by paralysis." The fact that the moving cause
behind this result was "mental," rather than "physical," did not deter
the court from concluding that it was an accident.
In McDonald, the worker suffered a fatal heart attack while on
the employment premises during working hours. However, the show-
ing of any particular physical exertion was weak at best. He had walk-
ed about 150 yards up and down two small flights of stairs before
the symptoms appeared. He was working the "graveyard shift," begin-
ning shortly before midnight, and had just arrived to fill out his time
card and get special instructions for the upcoming shift. He was only
36 years old. The trial and appellate courts had granted death benefits,
noting the physical strain the employee worked under (though obvious-
ly not on the day in question).' Both courts also noted the mental
stress that he was experiencing. His employer had recently announced
a mill closure. There was evidence that he was worried about that
and the impending loss of his job. Moreover, the crews that he super-
vised were increasingly shorthanded, less than diligent, and forced
to work with delapidated equipment. He often pitched in to work with
the crews himself. The evidence reflected that this state of affairs
had continued for the two weeks prior to the fatal attack.
The supreme court affirmed the death benefits, but ignored the
physical stress aspect altogether. Citing Ferguson, the court noted
that an unexpected result produced upon an employee by "extraor-
dinary mental or emotional work-related stress" had been treated
as a compensable accident. Also, the court observed that "the character
of the case does not change in kind, but only in degree when the
stimulus takes the form of sustained anxiety or pressure leading to
heart attack or cerebral hemorrhage."8 This is certainly an accurate
statement. Whether the mental stress seems to be a single incident,
as in Ferguson, or a collection of stresses over a two-week period,
as in McDonald, is a matter of quantity, not quality. But the
understandable result in McDonald should not be taken as an an-
nouncement of a new rule on the issue of proof of accident and causal
link between employment and accident. It is at most a refinement
of the long-standing principle that the causal relationship between
employment and accident is essential. When we mistrusted claims of
7. McDonald v. International Paper Co., 398 So. 2d 1182 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
These courts had allowed penalties and attorney's fees, which award was reversed
by the supreme court.
8. 406 So. 2d at 583.
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"mental" stress, we defined "accident" in physical terms. As we
understood mental stress better, we were willing to concede that
physical effects could have mental causes. Certainly even then, we
felt safer if the mental stress was, like many physical causes, a single
identifiable event. And, it always made us feel more secure if the
worker was squarely in the course of his employment at the time
of his accident. But now, we begin to understand that chronic mental
stresses, rather than acute ones, may also produce disabling effects.
But we must always remember that the longer the period over
which the stress continues and the more diffuse the supposed sources
of the stress become, the more tenuous is the causal relationship be-
tween the employment and the accident. Singling out employment as
the moving cause in the disability, even at our fairly "liberal" level
of doing so, is still crucial. The duration of the stress period and all
of its sources must be carefully considered in reaching a conclusion
on this issue.
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CASES AFTER 1975
The cases decided since the 1975 amendments9 to the Act pro-
viding broader occupational disease coverage appear to be consistent
with the spirit of those amendments. In an early case,0 an expansive
reading of the coverage was approved although the court found that
the claimant could not establish that his lung condition was caused
by his employment rather than by causes to which the general popula-
tion might have been equally exposed.
Then, in Schouest v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., the supreme court
took a similar view. The claimant had been employed by the defen-
dant as a sandblaster off and on for over fifteen years. He was diag-
nosed as having silicosis. His physician described his impairment as
"slight" and opined that it would not interfere with the performance
of moderate to heavy work, so long as it was work in a silica-free
environment. His employer paid him some temporary disability
benefits and medical expenses and offered him a job in an allegedly
silica-free environment. The claimant chose not to return to the
employer's business, and his benefits were terminated. His suit for
disability benefits followed.
The trial court held that the claimant was not disabled. The ap-
pellate court held that although the claimant ultimately would likely
9. LA. R.S. 23:1331.1 (Supp. 1952 & 1975).
10. Page v. Prestressed Concrete Co., 399 So. 2d 657 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert.
not considered, 401 So. 2d 994 (La. 1981).
11. 411 So. 2d 1042 (La. 1982).
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be disabled by his condition, he was not disabled at present.'2 The
supreme court concluded that he was partially disabled. The supreme
court first noted that silicosis was an occupational disease even under
the schedule coverage which prevailed from 1952 until 1975. Thus,
one might have argued that whatever interpretation might be given
to the 1975 amendments, there was no legislative intent to eliminate
coverage for those occupational diseases which had previously been
specifically mentioned. The court did not specifically adopt this con-
cept, but neither did it seem to feel itself hemmed in by the notions
of "characteristic of" and "peculiar to" found in the broad occupational
disease coverage. Indeed, neither phrase is mentioned in the opinion.
Silicosis may well be "characteristic of" employment as a sandblaster,
but it probably is not "peculiar to" such employment. Properly, that
fact did not keep the court from concluding that this claimant's silicosis
was employment-related, as the facts appeared clearly to link the con-
dition to his employment. Other decisions also indicate that the limiting
statutory language will not be decisive when the causal link between
the employment and the condition is clear."3
"INCREASED RISK" IN HEART CASES
The supreme court has recently given conflicting signals in cases
involving the proof of a causal link between employment and a dis-
abling or fatal heart attack. In rapid succession, the court dealt with
cases involving a number of heart-related problems. In Guillory v.
United States Fidelity & Casualty Co.," the court faced the question
of whether an accident which was clearly job-related and involved the
heart was the cause of the present disability of the worker. And in
McDonald v. International Paper Co., 5 the court decided the issue of
whether a heart attack apparently brought on by gradual mental stress
over a two-week period was a compensable accident at all.
Two other opinions stand. out on the issue of causal relationship
between employment and heart attack, and they represent two clear-
ly opposed views of the problem. The facts in Adams v. New Orleans
Public Service, Inc."' were not very supportive of plaintiff's claim. For
12. Schouest v. J. Ray McDermott Co., No. 11, 581 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981) (un-
published).
13. Lofton v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 410 So. 2d 1171 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied,
412 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1982) ("chronic obstructive pulmonary disease" traceable to employ-
ment in lumber mill and benefits for occupational disease awarded; no mention of such
a disease being both "characteristic of and peculiar to" such employment); Dupont v.
Ebasco Services, Inc., 411 So. 2d 605 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982) (silicosis; sandblaster;
no mention of statutory language).
14. __ So. 2d -, No. 81-C-2471 (La. July 2, 1982).
15. 406 So. 2d 582 (La. 1981).
16. 418 So. 2d 485 (La. 1982).
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over 30 years, he had worked for other employers as an automotive
mechanic, and he only began work with the defendant on a proba-
tionary appointment about 90 days before he experienced minor symp-
toms of heart problems while at work. But he made no complaints
to co-employees at that time, according to the appellate court's opinion.
Shortly thereafter, he was hospitalized for tests, which revealed
arteriosclerotic heart diesease of long standing. Both lower courts
denied compensation on that showing, a result fairly well in line with
other decisions in which no particular stress or exertion was
demonstrated.' 7 Moreover, his brief period of employment with the
defendant would not have permitted the court to conclude that the
disease itself was somehow traceable to the employment.
In its opinion on original hearing, the supreme court reversed.
The court noted the claimant's testimony that he had complained to
his wife of symptoms about two weeks before the more serious inci-
dent that produced his hospitalization. And on the occasion of that
more serious incident, at least one co-worker testified that the claim-
ant told him simply that he was "feeling real bad." The court held
that the claimant's disability "occurred by accident" because the
attacks and symptoms came "suddenly and unexpectedly," even in the
absence of physical stress. On the question of causal link between
that accident and employment, the court concluded that "[tlhe only
pertinent inquiry is whether in fact, the accident happened on the
job." 8
There were three dissents, and ultimately a rehearing was
granted. Before an opinion had been rendered, the court decided
Guidry v. Sline Industrial Painters, Inc.'9 In Guidry, the worker suf-
fered a fatal heart attack, secondary to atherosclerotic heart disease,
minutes after pausing for a smoke break at work. He was 53, had
done manual labor for most of his life, and had worked virtually
nonstop from 7:30 a.m. until 2:00 p.m. on the day of his death, except
for a lunch break.
The court reviewed the familiar litany of Louisiana heart cases
from Bertrand" through Leleux' and Roussel' to Adams. It properly
17. Adams v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 395 So. 2d 470 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1981).
18. 418 So. 2d at 488.
19. 418 So. 2d 626 (La. 1982). The appellate court opinion is Guidry v. Sline In-
dustrial Painters, Inc., 406 So. 2d 303 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981), in which the writing
judge expressed strong disagreement with the Adams opinion but felt bound to follow
it and grant compensation.
20. Bertrand v. Coal Operators Cas. Co., 253 La. 1115, 221 So. 2d 816 (1969).
21. Leleux v. Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 318 So. 2d 15 (La. 1975).
22. Roussel v. Colonial Sugars Co., 318 So. 2d 37 (La. 1975).
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concluded that Adams could not be regarded as representative of the
usual position in such cases.
Contrary to the language in Adams . . . the cases out of this
Court, however liberal they might occasionally have been insofar
as finding sufficient the amount of stress or exertion which has
contributed to a given heart accident, have nonetheless never
before taken the position [that] the absence of physical stress or
exertion is of no moment, or that the occurrence of a heart at-
tack on the job is the only relevant inquiry.23
Thus the court "expressly" rejected the Adams language that "where
an injury occurs suddenly or unexpectedly it is compensable despite
the absence of any physical stress or exertion" and "[tihe only perti-
nent inquiry is whether in fact, the accident happened on the job." 4
The court preferred an analysis suggested by Professor Larson,
which has also been used in various formulations by the Louisiana
courts themselves. Where the disability or death is traceable in part
(as in Guidry) to a pre-existing "personal" risk brought to the
workplace by the worker, the "employment contribution must take
the form of an exertion greater than that of nonemployment life.
• . . [T]he comparison is not with this employee's usual exertion in
his employment but with the exertions of normal nonemployment life
of this or any other person."' If there is no pre-existing personal causal
contribution, then any exertion connected with the employment and
causally related to the collapse will suffice. In both instances, the
medical evidence must support a causal relationship between the ex-
ertion and the attack.
These are well-recognized principles in Louisiana, simply refined
and applied in the heart cases in a clear fashion. The problem has
always been to single out "employment" risks from those other risks
to which the general public is equally exposed. We use various devices
to accomplish this objective, and among the most important such
device is the question of whether the injury "arises out of" the employ-
ment. Due to the liberal interpretation of our Act and because of the
ease of application of the test, we have been inclined to compensate
many injuries occurring squarely "in the course of' employment,
23. 418 So. 2d at 632.
24. 418 So. 2d at 487 & 488. Dixon, C.J., who had authored the majority
opinion in Adams, naturally took umbrage at this rejection in his concurring opinion
in Guidry: "Needed clarity and simplicity is not here accomplished. We only furnish
fodder for claims adjusters, lawyers and expert witnesses in future cases--was there
stress or no stress? It would be preferable to say, simply, that a disabling on-the-job
accident is compensable." 418 So. 2d at 635 (Dixon, C.J., concurring).
25. 418 So. 2d at 633 n.15 (quoting 1 B.A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
S 38.83, at 7-237 (1980) (emphasis removed).
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although not so clearly "arising out of' the employment. Many of these,
however, are the so-called "neutral" risks, such as acts of nature which
injure the employee on the job.
When the question of "personal" risks brought to the workplace
by the claimant is under discussion, however, conficting causes are
clearer. If a pre-existing condition is traceable to other employment,
or to factors entirely outside the employment, there is a place in socie-
ty other than within the employment where such losses could be borne.
The worker, nonetheless, is entitled to substantial benefit of the doubt
when the symptoms actually appear in the course of employment.
But that does not mean that some employment link is unnecessary
in such "personal risk" cases. Earlier cases indicated that the employ-
ment link ought to be shown by some unusual exertion or stress
beyond what the employee would ordinarily have encountered in his
own job. This was the clearest and easiest demonstration that, under
the heading of an "increased risk" theory, the employment link was
present. It no doubt will remain the most common means of
establishing the link between the employment and the injury.
However, now the court also indicates that the employment link
may be established by a showing that the "employment exertion,"
whatever form it might take, is greater than that of "nonemployment
life."26 While not particularly difficult to establish, this is nonetheless
a requirement which goes beyond a simple statement that any heart
attack in the workplace is presumed to be traceable to employment.
Perhaps the Guidry opinion is a reflection of judicial reaction to
the substantially increased benefits available under the Act after the
1975 amendments. When recoveries at the maximum level permitted
by the Act could be discounted to a lump sum recovery of less than
$25,000, it might not have made a great amount of difference that
a decision such as the original opinion in Adams was rendered. Now
recoveries, in some instances, can be ten times that amount; hence,
such a decision may be too lenient, although administratively conve-
nient. Of course, nothing on this topic is mentioned in the opinion.
26. Even under this standard, a decision such as Barnes v. City of New Orleans,
322 So. 2d 821 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975) (clerical employee suffered fatal heart attack
at home; some minor symptoms might have occurred at work) would probably be er-
roneous. The supreme court indicates as much in a footnote in the Guidry opinion
by saying that Barnes "did expand upon the jurisprudence" and pointedly observing
that the decision was one of an intermediate appellate court and "there has not been
a similar case handed down by this Court." 418 So. 2d at 631 n.10. Of course, the
opinion in McDonald v. International Paper Co., 406 So. 2d 582 (La. 1981), may prove
to be the salvation of office workers, since it holds that gradual mental stress producing
physical effects such as a heart attack may nonetheless be a compensable accident.
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Shortly before the preparation of this symposium article, the
supreme court handed down its opinion in the rehearing of Adams.
Chief Justice Dixon was still the writing justice, and the result was
the same: partial disability benefits. But the two controversial
statements in the original Adams opinion, in effect, were deleted from
the opinion on rehearing:
It is needless, now, to discuss the differences arising from these
statements in this opinion. Agreement on their meaning and im-
plications is not essential to the conclusion of the majority that
Adams is entitled to compensation. After rehearing was granted
in the Adams case, Guidry . . . was decided. There, a majority
of the court stated, "we expressly reject" the two statements in
the first Adams opinion. The rejection is discussed at length in
the Guidry opinion."
The opinion in Adams on rehearing emphasized the heat and physical
stress of the claimant's employment as a moving factor in producing
the accident and ultimately the disability. To that extent, at least,
it appears to be more in the mode of the traditional Louisiana heart
cases than had the original opinion. And as between the two, Guidry
now becomes the more definitive present statement of the position
of a majority of the supreme court.
RETAINED EMPLOYEE: SCHEDULE Loss WHEN EARNING SAME WAGE?
Although not limited to a retained employee, a potential conflict
is posed by the injured worker who promptly returns'to work at the
same or a higher wage. If his injury would entitle him to a specific
schedule loss, but he is nonetheless not partially disabled because he
is earning the same or a higher wage, is he entitled to the schedule
loss?
Prior to the 1975 amendments, a worker who received an award
based on total disability had no interest in pursuing a schedule loss.
The schedule, as a practical matter, was applicable only to those who
could not prove total disability. Partial disability was almost non-
existent. After the 1975 amendments,28 a worker might be better off
under the schedule than under partial disability if the difference be-
tween his old and new wage was minimal. But when such a worker
27. Adams v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 418 So. 2d 488, 492 (La. 1982).
Chief Justice Dixon added in a footnote that he regretted that he found no merit
in the rejection of the statements which "taken in context, were not incorrect and
might have helped eliminate some specious arguments in compensation cases." Id., at
492 n.1.
28. See LA. R.S. 23:1221 (1950 & Supp. 1975).
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is not "disabled" at all (i.e., apparently, he has not lost any earning
capacity), should he receive the schedule benefit?
The pre-1975 answer was that he should receive the schedule
benefit, on the ground that the schedule loss was a built-in minimum
for injury, despite the fact that there might have been no loss of pre-
sent earning capacity.' Predictably, the post-1975 answer apparently
will be the same. In Jacks v. Banister Pipelines America," the supreme
court faced the situation of a worker who suffered the loss of an eye
but returned to work for the same employer and others at the same
or a higher wage, after a brief period of convalescence. He had received
a few weeks of temporary total disability benefits during his con-
valescence, but was denied any further benefits. He sued for total
and permanent disability benefits, but was limited to partial disabili-
ty benefits by the trial and appellate courts. 1 He contended in the
supreme court that he was entitled to the schedule benefits for loss
of an eye, in addition to the benefits based upon partial disability.
The court noted the difficulty in predicting whether benefits based
upon partial disability or benefits based on the schedule loss would afford
the worker the greater protection. Under the circumstances, the court
concluded that the prior rule should continue to apply under the post-1975
disability provisions: the worker should be awarded benefits based
on the specific loss "as a minimum," with reservation of his right to
recover under the partial disability provisions in the event those
should prove more favorable. The employer is entitled to a credit
against any ultimate partial disability award for any amounts which
he might have paid for the schedule loss, on a week-for-week basis.2
This is a proper result, and it respects the pre-viously established
proposition that the schedule loss is not based upon loss of present
earning capacity. Rather, the schedule loss may be equated to a
presumption of potential loss of earning capacity following a work-
related injury, for which the worker is entitled to some remedy,
limited though it may be. The decision will work in harmony with
the partial disability provisions, since the worker retains the right
to seek benefits on that basis if his condition worsens to the point
that he is no longer earning the same or a higher wage.
29. See Lacour v. Highlands Ins. Co., 247 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971); Ven-
tress v. Danel-Ryder, Inc., 225 So. 2d 765 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
30. 418 So. 2d 524 (La. 1982).
31. Jacks v. Banister Pipelines Am., 396 So. 2d 604 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
32. See the analogous cases of Lewing v. Vancouver Plywood Co., 350 So. 2d 1320
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); Futrell v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 271
(La. 1973); Cain v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 201 So. 2d 286 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1967).
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OVERPAYMENT OF BENEFITS BY EMPLOYER OR INSURER
In Carter v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,3" the claimant had injured
his ankle in the course of his employment and had received weekly
benefits and reimbursement of medical expenses on that basis. About
four months later, the medical reports showed a full recovery and
he was cleared to return to work. Shortly thereafter, he began to
complain of pain in his knee and received treatment therefor. For about
six months more, the employer paid weekly benefits and reimbursed
medical expenses, presumably on the basis that the knee injury was
related to the same incident. But ultimately (about ten months after
the original incident), the employer terminated benefits and refused
to reimburse any further expenses.
The employee's suit to establish that benefits should be resumed
because the knee problem continued and was a result of the employ-
ment incident was unsuccessful. The court was of the opinion that
only the ankle injury, and not the knee, was traceable to the employ-
ment. Thus it held that compensation was not due past the date on
which the medical reports indicated that the ankle was healed.
The employer sought by reconventional demand to recover all
those amounts which it had paid after the date on which the employee's
ankle injury was ultimately determined to be at an end. The trial
court had granted that relief, but the appellate court denied it. The
employer had argued that these payments constituted payment of a
thing not due under article 2301 of the Civil Code, creating a quasi-
contract in its favor for their return. Citing a principle apparently
adopted by the supreme court in a noncompensation case, the court
held that a voluntary payment "made with full knowledge of all the
facts and not under duress may not subsequently be recovered, even
though the amount so paid is not actually owed."' The employer was
aware of the medical report indicating full recovery, but continued
payments for another six months, no doubt because the employee was
then complaining of a knee injury which might have been employment-
related.
The court's holding is not surprising. No doubt, the employee no
longer had the funds which had been paid to him over the six months,
and it would have been a substantial burden on him to have returned
the amount to the employer. But, the holding puts employers and in-
surers in a difficult position. At the risk of penalties and attorney's
fees, an employer or insurer must be virtually certain that no further
compensation could possibly be due before it terminates benefits which
33. 413 So. 2d 309 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
34. 413 So. 2d at 314. See Whitehall Oil Co. v. Boagni, 217 So. 2d 707 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1968) (Tate, J., dissenting), aff'd, 229 So. 2d 702 (La. 1969).
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are being paid. If subsequent medical reports contradict the earlier
optimistic ones, the employer or insurer can ignore them only at its
peril."
Suppose that in the present case, the employer had terminated
benefits at the four-month point, at which time the medical reports
showed that the ankle had healed.' And suppose that the same medical
reports showed (as they did) that a complaint was made at that point,
for the first time, about the worker's knee and, while the examining
physician did not believe the complaint to be related to trauma, the
worker was being referred to another physician. And suppose that
on the basis of that last report, the employer terminated benefits.
Penalties and attorney's fees would be a likely prospect.
So what is the employer to do? Terminate and risk penalties? Or
pay for a while longer, with no prospect of regaining those payments
if made in error? Almost certainly, the latter is the more advisable
course. But the employer or insurer, to protect its own interest, should
be very diligent in following the medical opinions during the period
in which the continuing disability of the claimant is in doubt. The
opinion in Carter does not reflect whether the employer or insurer
kept close tabs on the medical situation during the six-month period
that ultimately was determined to be one in which compensation
benefits were not due. Such scrutiny is the only way to enable the
employer to make the judgment, with legal counsel, of whether
benefits can safely be terminated without risking penalties and at-
torney's fees, or whether they should be continued for a while longer,
with no real prospect of getting them back at a future time.
APPLICABILITY OF COLLATERAL SOURCE DOCTRINE
The relationship of social security benefits and workers' compen-
sation benefits37 is not the only problem area involving duplication
of benefits. Not infrequently, medical expenses recoverable under
workers' compensation are also reimbursable from medical coverages
paid for wholly by the employer, or sometimes paid for partially by
the employer and partially by the employee. In the tort context, such
a problem often is solved under the rubric of the collateral source
doctrine, which really ought to be called the doctrine of denial of the
collateral source. The usual statement of the doctrine is that a defen-
dant may not plead an offset as to certain expenses traceable to his
conduct and for which he would ordinarily be liable simply because
35. See 2 W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 4, S 389.
36. The petition sought recovery for injury to the claimant's "leg and ankle" but
never sought recovery for. injury to the knee.
37. See 1 W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 4, S 289.
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the victim did not actually incur them.' If the victim's sister is a physi-
cian and renders care to him free of charge, the collateral source doc-
trine would not permit the defendant to deny liability for a reasonable
charge for those services. 9 If the victim has medical insurance which
picks up the tab for some of his expenses, the defendant is not entitled
to the benefit of this "windfall" by way of a deduction of that amount
from the judgment. In other words, the defendant should not benefit sim-
ply because he injured a prudent, insured victim rather than an uninsured
one.
The courts have not had much occasion to deal with this problem
in the compensation context. Perhaps this is due to the fact that until
the last few years, private insurance plans were not prevalent, because
medical expenses were not that staggering. But of course now these
expenses are substantial, and there are a good number of medical
plans which may overlap with compensation coverage.
This problem was presented in Bryant v. New Orleans Public Ser-
vice, Inc.4" At the time of injury, the compensation statute provided
an initial $12,500.00 coverage for medical expenses and an additional
$12,500.00 if the employee could show that he or she would be sub-
jected to "undue and unusual hardship" without reimbursement for
those expenses. The trial court determined that the claimant was sub-
ject to such a hardship due to additional expenses and ordered the
employer to pay the excess amount. However, the trial judge granted
the employer's request for a credit against that amount for any
amounts covered by the claimant's husband's group health insurance
policy.
The appellate court reversed the latter ruling on the ground that
the collateral source rule prohibited such an offset in a compensation
case, as it presumably would prohibit such an offset in a tort case
on similar facts.4
1
The supreme court affirmed the result, but set the collateral
source question to the side. It held that the credit in the employer's
favor was prohibited by Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1163, which
forbids "any employer ... to collect from any of his employees directly
or indirectly .. .any amount whatever . ..either for the purpose
of paying the premium in whole or in part on any liability or compen-
sation insurance of any kind . . .or to reimburse such employer [for
38. See Hall v. State Dept. of Highways, 213 So. 2d 169 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 252 La. 959, 215 So. 2d 128 (1968), and authorities therein cited.
39. See Spizer v. Dixie Brewing Co., 210 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
40. 414 So. 2d 322 (La. 1982).
41. Bryant v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 406 So. 2d 767, 768 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1981).
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such premiums]." The court reasoned that the indirect effect of the
contested credit would be to have the employee (in this instance
through her spouse) contribute to the cost of workers' compensation.
The court distinguished an earlier decision, which had permitted reduc-
tion of statutory retirement disability benefits by the amount received
in workers' compensation benefits, on the ground that the worker
therein had received the full compensation benefits and the retire-
ment statute mandated the reduction as to the other benefits.42
The court's result is probably correct, although it could be argued
that since the claimant's husband's employer apparently bore all of
the cost of the group health plan, there was no direct or indirect con-
tribution by the couple to that plan or to workers' compensation. But
if the husband's employer was paying those premiums in lieu of addi-
tional wages, such "deferred compensation" otherwise would have in-
ured to the benefit of the couple to do with as they saw fit. In this
light, it might be said that granting the credit would have made them
contribute to the plan or to workers' compensation, whether they
wanted to or not.
In the days to come, overlap of coverage could become a problem,
and to the extent of the duplication, it may be an unnecessary expen-
diture. Some legislative attention needs to be given to the problem
of offsetting of benefit and medical expense coverages against other
coverages available to employees.
THE INTENTIONAL ACT EXCLUSION: FURTHER JUDICIAL REACTION
The supreme court recently returned to the problem of the inten-
tional act exception to the exclusivity of the compensation remedy,
in the interesting case of Citizen v. Daigle.43 The plaintiff was employed
in a hardware store owned by the defendant. A patron had returned
a rifle purchased there, complaining that it would not fire. Another
clerk had tested the weapon and determined that the patron's com-
plaint was accurate. Cormier, another employee, was assigned the task
of packing the rifle for shipment to the manufacturer for repair. As
a "practical joke," he aimed the weapon at the plaintiff and fired. To
his surprise, it discharged, injuring the plaintiff in the upper leg.
The plaintiff recovered compensation benefits against his employer
and sought tort damages against his co-employee and that employee's
homeowner's insurer. Both lower courts determined that the harm
42. Patterson v. City of Baton Rouge, 309 So. 2d 306 (La. 1975).
43. 418 So. 2d 598 (La. 1982). See Johnson, Developments in the Law,
1980-1981-Workers' Compensation, 42 LA. L. REV. 620 (1982), for a discussion of other
aspects of the intentional act exclusion.
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was not intentional" and that it was not outside of the normal course
and scope of employment. Thus there was no exception to take the
injury out of the Act and permit a tort remedy against the co-
employee.
In the supreme court, the plaintiff pressed his contention that the
concept of transferred or constructive intent sufficed to authorize his
recovery. He contended that since Cormier intended an assault and
accomplished harmful contact (battery), classic tort theory authorized
a recovery for what Cormier actually accomplished." Cormier's intent
to assault, the plaintiff argued, could have been transferred to the
tort of battery, since Cormier should not have been absolved of blame
because he actually accomplished something worse than he intended.
The majority opinion did not directly address this contention. The
court held that an assault was intended and that the plaintiff might
have recovered for damages due to an assault, but the plaintiff "did
not seek recovery of damages resulting from" the assault, but rather
sought damages for the shooting. The court also noted that the plain-
tiff did not seek damages resulting from intentional infliction of men-
tal distress, suggesting that perhaps some damages might have been
forthcoming on that basis.
There are several minor objections to the majority opinion. The
court probably should have dealt squarely with the plaintiffs conten-
tion that the proven intent to assault sufficed to establish the requisite
intent for battery. The concurring opinion of Justice Dennis comes
much closer to grappling with the issue by suggesting that the
legislature did not intend for "constructive intent" cases to fall within
the exception. He indicates that "intentional act" and "intentional tort"
may not be identical after all. "Intentional tort" concepts may include
transferred intent; "intentional act" may not, if the concept is limited
to what a particular actor actually intended.
The majority opinion also shows a disturbing tendency to return
to some sort of "theory" or "writ" pleading.'" On that basis, the plain-
44. Citizen v. Daigle, 392 So. 2d 741 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 13 (1965):
An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending to
cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third per-
son, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a harmful contact
with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.
(emphasis added).
46. This may be seen in cases in some other fields as well. See Kraaz v. La Quin-
ta Motor Inns, Inc., 410 So. 2d 1048 (La. 1982) (plaintiff barred from recovery against
motel owner on contract theory, but could recover in tort); DeBattista v. Argonaut-
Southwest Ins. Co., 403 So. 2d 26 (La. 1981) (plaintiff barred from recovery against
blood bank on contract theory, but could recover in tort); Meador v. Toyota of Jeffer-
son, Inc., 332 So. 2d 433 (La. 1976) (plaintiff could not recover mental distress damages
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tiff lost because his facts did not fit his "writ" of battery, although
they might have fit a "writ" for assault or for intentional infliction
of mental distress, which he did not possess.
However, the majority opinion is to be commended for its result,
which continues a narrow view of the exception. There appeared to
be no serious contention that the plaintiff was not entitled to com-
pensation, indicating that the conduct was not intentional, at least
with reference to the employer. And if the claimant had been an in-
jured patron, no one would seriously consider proceeding against the
employer as a matter of "intent" rather than "negligence." 7 Thus it
is appropriate to leave the claimant with his compensation remedy.
It may be puzzling to some that the courts have proved so
unreceptive to the "intentional act" tort suits. This reluctance prob-
ably is traceable in part to the courts' unconscious reaction to the
disparity between the sanction and the offense. In these times, leav-
ing compensation and regaining the tort system may mean a substan-
tial difference in amounts of money recovered. And where the costs
of that difference may ultimately be cast back upon the employer,
there is reason to doubt the wisdom of such an escape. Moreover,
giving an injured employee a tort remedy as a sanction for "wanton"
or "reckless" employer or co-employee conduct probably is out of pro-
portion with the evil sought to be redressed. Certainly, we do not
want to encourage or even tolerate such conduct in the workplace,
any more than we want to tolerate negligent conduct. But that does
not mean that the sanction has to be a departure from the Compensa-
tion Act and a reentry into the tort system. It is pr0obably better
that we reserve that sanction for particularly heinous conduct, such
as the unjustified physical assault upon an employee by a supervisor. 8
Seen from this point of view, it is understandable that the courts
have been reluctant to impose the "ultimate" sanction of a tort remedy
on the employer or a co-employee (or their insurers) short of conduct
which clearly satisfies the present exception, without the assistance
of legal conclusions of the pleader, transferred intent, or similar efforts.
This suggests a middle ground which would more closely equate
the sanction with the conduct. If the conduct of the employer or a
in breach of contract action, although court noted she could have done so in an action
"sounding in tort"). Such decisions may be violative of article 891 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which provides for a system of fact pleading in Louisiana.
47. Of course, there may be other reasons why negligence would be preferred
over intent in proof of the case. A conclusion of intentional tort might eliminate liability
insurance coverage. Also no punitive damages are available for an intentional tort
in Louisiana, and no particular advantage is to be gained along those lines.
48. See Rennier v. Johnson, 410 So. 2d 1149 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
412 So. 2d 1115 (La. 1982) (two dissents).
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co-employee is "reckless," or "wanton," or a "deliberate failure" to
use a safety device, 9 as opposed to ordinary negligence or no fault
at all, perhaps a percentage increase in compensation payable to the
claimant could be considered as a penalty." A number of states have
enacted such provisions, and some states have included a percentage
decrease in compensation to claimants for similar conduct on their part,
instead of the all-or-nothing defenses which we now have."
If a sanction more appropriate to the offense could be developed,
perhaps the courts would not be so reluctant to apply it. And a sanc-
tion which the court would apply will go a lot further toward encourag-
ing safety in the workplace than will a sanction which is almost never
applied because it is too draconian.
And perhaps we should clarify the conduct which would lead to
a tort remedy rather than a penalty. We could provide that there
is no immunity from tort for any person who "commits an intentional
tort against an employee" or, alternatively, who "intentionally harms
an employee." In either phrase, there would be two important results.
First, the vague phrase "intentional act," which could have been broad-
ly interpreted in favor of tort actions, would become more restrictive
and more in line with the purpose of the original legislative intent.
And second, the potential vicarious liability of an employer would be
eliminated. If the immunity is taken away from the person who inten-
tionally harms the employee, there would be no way to conclude that
the employer would fall in that category-unless, of course, he were
actually the natural person who committed the intentional tort.
UNINSURED MOTORIST CARRIER NOT A THIRD PERSON LIABLE IN TORT
Coverage for damages caused by an uninsured, or underinsured,
49. See generally LA. R.S. 23:1081 (1950) (the description of employee conduct which
may lead to a complete denial of compensation).
50. For example, if an employee could establish that the defined conduct subject
to sanction had occurred, his compensation would be 15% higher than it would other-
wise have been. Such a claim would remain within the Act and would not be subject
to jury trial. This concept is subject to the criticism that (a) it is a fine payable to
a private litigant and (b) it punishes conduct by increasing a payment for diminished
worker capacity, when the capacity will not necessarily be more substantially diminished
than it would have been absent the conduct.
51. See Ky. REV. STAT. S 342.165 (1981) (15% increase, 15% decrease); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 152, S 28 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1976) (100% increase); Mo. ANN. STAT. S 287.120(4)
(Supp. 1982) (15% increase, 15% decrease for employee on more limited grounds); N.C.
GEN. STAT. S 97-12 (1979) (10% increase, 10% decrease for employee on more limited
grounds); UTAH CODE ANN. S 35-1-12 (1974) (10% increase). Some statutes impose a stan-
dard of clear and convincing evidence, some limit the conduct to that of supervisory
employees in charge of safety, and all attempt to define the reprobated conduct in
fairly specific terms.
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motorist is very extensive in Louisiana, and its existence has offered
new vistas for claimants seeking to receive tort damages for work-
related injuries. If an employee is injured in a compensable accident
but is prohibited from suing his employer or a co-employee in tort,
it can be argued that such a defendant is a person from whom the
employee is "legally entitled to recover damages" but who is "unin-
sured" in the sense that the employee cannot recover anything from
him. Thus, the argument goes, the employee should be entitled to
recover from an uninsured motorist carrier providing coverage either
to the employer or co-employee, or to the claimant himself.
In recent decisions, the Louisiana courts have properly denied such
claims. 2 The tort action preserved by the Act is intended to permit
the injured employee to seek tort recovery against persons outside
the employment family altogether. In other words, the Act is not in-
tended to deny to the injured employee those rights in tort that he
had before the Act and which have nothing to do with his employ-
ment. The conduct of a tortfeasor also may entitle the injured
employee to certain rights in compensation against his employer. But
the Act should not be read to grant to the injured employee any ad-
ditional tort recoveries against the employer or co-employee beyond
those specifically provided (such as for an intentional act). The greater
the expansion of real or imagined tort rights against the employer
or co-employees, the greater the damage to the delicate compromise
which underlies the Act.
The present issue, though, takes the problem one further step.
Here, it is argued, neither the employer nor a co-employee is being
asked to contribute to tort damages. Rather, the defendant is an in-
surer who has contracted to provide coverage to individuals who are
injured by a tortfeasor who cannot pay for what he has done. Is the
delicate compromise still affected?
52. Fox v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 413 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982) (worker
killed through negligence of co-employee; claim against employer's uninsured motorist
carrier rejected on ground that immunity defense of co-employee was not personal
and could be raised by liability carrier; and if no liability as to co-employee, then no
uninsured motorist coverage); Beard v. Assumption Parish Police Jury, 413 So. 2d 923
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1982) (similar, except injury rather than death); Gray v. Margot,
Inc., 408 So. 2d 436 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981) (worker injured through negligence of
co-employee; claim against his own uninsured motorist carrier rejected on ground that
coverage existed only as to those persons from whom the worker was "legally enti-
tled" to recover but from whom he could not recover due to uninsurance or underin-
surance and he was not "legally entitled" to recover from co-employee); Carlisle v.
State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 400 So. 2d 284 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
So. 2d 1256 (La. 1981) (three dissents) (writ request probably based on other grounds)
(worker severely injured through negligence of co-employee; claim against worker's
own uninsured motorist carrier rejected).
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Clearly it is. The Act represents a societal judgment that
workplace accidents, generally speaking, are to be dealt with in the
compensation system and not in the tort system. The more limited
recovery which compensation brings (theoretically in a more prompt
fashion) will ultimately be borne by the public, in its capacity as con-
sumers of the product or service provided by the injured employee's
enterprise. The same persons will bear the cost of tort damages fun-
neled through the uninsured motorist premiums paid by that same
enterprise, but they will do so at a significantly higher level. Con-
sumers of the product of the enterprise will thus be paying costs for
workplace accidents based upon tort damages rather than compensa-
tion benefits, and that is directly counter to the societal judgment
made in the Act.
Somewhat different arguments might be made for the case in
which the injured employee is seeking to recover from his own unin-
sured motorist carrier sums that he cannot recover from a co-employee
for a workplace accident. Here, it may be said that the injured
employee paid for this "extra" coverage out of his own pocket and
should be entitled to the benefit of what he paid for. But the entire
scheme of uninsured motorist coverage is designed to give to the in-
jured motorist an immediate source of recovery, with the ultimate
responsibility to be cast upon the actual tortfeasor, if at all possible.
The scheme does not deny tort damages; it simply gives the motorist
another source from which to receive those damages. The scheme does
not reveal a societal decision that motorists are not entitled to a tort
recovery when injured by an impecunious driver; rather, it demon-
strates that a tort recovery is so important that we will devise a
special scheme to help insure that it will occur.
The difference between uninsured motorist coverage and the Com-
pensation Act becomes apparent. The Act expresses the societal in-
tent that tort damages for workplace injuries are no longer the ex-
pected or desired remedy. Indeed, it has been held that no tort is
committed when an employer or a co-employee plays a role in injur-
ing the worker.5 To the extent that a "real" tortfeasor also plays
a role, we are willing to preserve that remedy.' But if there is no
53. See LeJeune v. Highlands Ins. Co., 287 So. 2d 531 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied,
290 So. 2d 903 (La. 1974); Hebert v. Blankenship, 187 So. 2d 798 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1966); 2 W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 4, S 374.
54. Thus there may be a cause of action against an injured employee's own unin-
sured motorist carrier, or his employer's carrier, if injury is caused wholly by the
conduct of an uninsured motorist outside the employment "Family." And presumably,
there could be a similar recovery when the injury is caused partially by an employee
and partially by an uninsured motorist who is not an employee, but reduced by the
percentage of fault of the employee-who has committed "no tort."
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"real" tortfeasor, then there is no "real" tort and no reason to devise
or use a scheme to assure a "real" tort recovery.
To the extent that we would permit an injured employee to
recover against his own uninsured motorist carrier under these cir-
cumstances, we would require that all purchasers of uninsured motorist
coverage assist in paying tort damages for injuries caused wholly by
workplace conditions. To do so would run counter to the concept ac-
cepted so long ago that injuries caused wholly by workplace condi-
tions are better dealt with outside of the tort system altogether.
Certainly, the purchase of uninsured motorist coverage is volun-
tary, and that introduces a factor to be considered. Perhaps one should
be entitled, in effect, to purchase "tort" coverage for workplace in-
juries caused by automobile use, if he wants to do that. But so long
as we make no distinctions between employees who purchase such
coverage and those who have no expectation of ever experiencing a
loss which would permit collection under such coverage, we have
spread tort damages for workplace injuries over too broad a group.
If we are committed to the concept that such injuries are best left
in compensation, then most of society has a right to expect this con-
cept to be respected until such time as the legislature makes it clear
that it intends an exception to be made.
Understandably (and perhaps happily), the recent decisions do not
go into such detail on the question. The courts were content to observe
that an injured employee has a right under section 1101 to sue in tort
against a person in whom there has been created "a legal liability to pay
damages" and that since no tort is committed by a co-employee who helps
injure the claimant, there is no such legal liability. Absent such legal
liability, there is no person from whom the claimant is "legally entitled
to recover damages" under the uninsured motorist statute. Thus there
is no basis for any recovery against the uninsured motorist carrier.
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